# 1AC

The metaphor of war is ingrained into our thinking.

The lexicon of war filters thought and guides action.

The US declares “war on terror”, and assumes that it can triumph. But terror is not a clear enemy but instead an idea.

We pretend to understand the enemy’s actions, reactions, and motivations, but we never identify exactly what is being fought against or even fought for.

While policymakers and –takers alike don’t ask any of the tough questions for fear of being labeled a dissenter, the war metaphor continues and the executive’s authority increases exponentially. The figurative becomes literal as reality reinforces the initial metaphor and the Other is devalued and marked for extermination.

#### The metaphor of war is ingrained in our thinking and actions, forcing us to attempt to understand the enemy without identifying the cause for fighting – the figurative becomes literal as reality reinforces the initial metaphor and the Other is devalued and marked for extermination, allowing exponential increase of executive authority

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The phrase "the war on terror" has been used so frequently that it is deeply entrenched in our thinking, so deeply that we might not realize that the phrase itself is not a description but a metaphor. The use of the war metaphor should be approached with caution, especially in the case of the war on terror. As with 8 '\*' Chapter One the influential phrase "The War on Drugs," widely used by the White House in the 1980s and 1990s, to say we are at war with something immediately invokes certain associations. It reduces an imposingly large, abstract, or disconcertingly complex problem to a well-defined, simplified, and ultimately manageable entity. It is difficult in a literal sense to be at war with something as opposed to someone, but by invoking the war metaphor, that "something," be it drugs or terror, is personified. Once the opposing idea is personified, metaphorically mutated into something approximating a human enemy, it appears possible to defeat that enemy, to achieve the clear triumph that would not be possible in battling either abstract concepts or complex and daunting social problems. The lure of such a promised victory proves almost irresistible it calls up the feelings of triumph, clarity, and righteous response that so often elude us in considering hard-to-solve problems. Although war may evoke a range of horrific associations, it also has a compelling appeal; an "appropriate" war on an appropriately framed enemy can actually be more comforting than frightening. As Michael Erard notes, a phrase like "the war on terror" subtly "encodes a frame in which an intangible terror can be targeted or conquered." The success of this strategic frame depends on "the martial fantasy of inevitable victory."l2 It comes to seem almost ignoble not to answer the war metaphor's call to arms. The imagety around the figurative war often participates in a lofty range of speech, calling up, through images of flags, banners, and bands of brothers, the sentiments we feel for nation, community, identity, and other such potent values. Jayne Docherty and Frank Blechman, scholars in the field of conflict resolution, urge that the war metaphor should be used with caution: "Every metaphor is a way of sensing [sic] the world and every metaphor is also a way of not sensing [sic] the world. If we lock onto a single description of the problem and the appropriate response too early, we may not discover the most effective long-term responses to a crisis."13 If we jettison the war metaphor in favor of another, new analogies might lead to new possibilities for response and resolution.

Why has the White House narrowed its metaphorical message so successfully that the war metaphor has largely over-taken all others? Why has the media echoed and replicated this metaphor in all its coverage? One answer to that question lies in the appeal, not of war itself, but of what the metaphor of war calls up. Erard notes that the phrase "war on terror" deliberately recycles a Cold War frame "in which we waged war on another intangible, Communism. And we won!" The promise of the phrase "the war on terror" is that "we can win this one, too." It invokes a national history of confident military strength: "America, after all, wins its wars."14 Beyond the powerful appeal to a triumphalist history of the allusion to narratives of victory, the war metaphor promises something that is perhaps equally powerful: the simplification of the complex, the clarification of the subtle.

There is a certain clarifying quality to an extreme metaphor such as the metaphor of war that makes it potentially very attractive. War has the ability to focus issues, framing them definitively and inarguably. The public rage directed against those who questioned the war on terror in its early days is evidence of this: simply to question the appropriateness of this frame was sensed [sic] as unpatriotic, even traitorous. One of the clearest examples of the war metaphor calling up the language of treason to brand sceptics is found in the response to an article penned by noted essayist Susan Sontag in the Septem~ ber 24, 2001 issue of The New Yorker. Sontag argued that the attacks of 9/11 needed to be understood within the broader context of decades of American foreign policy in the Middle East; in return, she was publicly denounced as a "quisling," a "fifth columnist," even a "pathetic ayatollah of hate.!! Political commentator Andrew Sullivan even invented a prize, the Susan Sontag award, for pillorying what he saw as the worst outpourings of the left."

Similarly, John Edwards, candidate for the Democratic presidential nomination, was also called a traitor when he repudiated the notion that there is a "global war on terror," calling this metaphorical framing an ideological doctrine advanced by the Bush administration. In a May 2007 defense policy speech, Edwards called the war on terror a "bumper sticker" slogan used by Bush to justify everything from abuses at the Abu Ghraib prison to the invasion of Iraq. "By framing this as a war," Edwards said, "we have walked right into the trap the terrorists have set-that we are engaged in some kind of clash of civilizations and a war on Islam." His statements were immediately denounced: on the conservative web site Townhall.com a reader wrote "All you anti-war traitors should hang. We are at war because there is an enemy that initiated the war. After that any speech that gives aid and comfort and encouragement to the enemy should be hanged as a traitor."l6

The war metaphor has also allowed the use of the term "Fifth Column" which disparages dissenters thought to pose an internal threat. Fifth columnists are traitors who act out of sympathy with the enemy to undermine a nation's solidarity from within. The term is currently being used by those on the political right to cast aspersions on academics and intellectuals who criticize the government by teaching the literature and politics of the Middle East. On the August 21, 2006, broadcast of his nationally syndicated radio show, Bill O'Reilly told his 3.5 million listenersl7 that "the Bush administration is in a war not only with the terrorists, but also with the far left in this country." Discussing the Bush administration's domestic surveillance program, which was recently struck down as unconstitutional by a federal district court 10 ''P Chaptet One judge, 0' Reilly described the "far left" as the "fifth column in this country."18 Once the conceptual structure of war has been evoked, it casts any dissent into a particularly negative, destructive light. Voices of difference are figured as dangerous, destructive, even traitorous: once we have war, it seems, we have traitors.

Just as wars involve two clearly defined sides, so the metaphor of war enticingly promises a clear narrative of aggressors and victims, winners and losers, soldiers and insurgents. Immediately after September 11, the war metaphor seemed, at first glance, to be reasonable: after all, the attack on the Pentagon was against a military target, the attacks were intended to challenge American economic and military power, and the level of damage made the south end of Manhattan look very much like a war zone, with all the attendant horror and chaos. However, other aspects of the attack do not fit this framing as well: The World Trade Center was not a military target; the attack vehicles were not military weapons; the attack was carried out entirely within this country; and, perhaps most importantly, the attackers did not represent the policy of another sovereign state. As events unfold, many commentators have cast doubts on the war metaphor, arguing that this is not (or should not be) a war against Islam, just against violent Islamic fundamentalists. These observers argue that the false clarity of the war metaphor effectively masks the many uncertainties and ambiguities of the War on Terror. For example, a sweepingly categorical term such as “enemy" can be used to obscure the fact that in this conflict the enemy is not a specifically national or a specifically religious one. As critics of the war on terror remind us, we need to beware of false logical propositions such as "All terrorists are Muslims therefore all Muslims are terrorists."19 In the war on terror, the identification of the enemy has been increasingly difficult and problematic. Is the enemy terror itself? How is such an abstraction to be fought? What territory can be gained in such a hypothetical battle? What will be the front lines in this terrain of abstraction and symbolism?

In spite of its difficulties, the war metaphor has remained dominant. If we are in a war, then we have a specific lexicon or vocabulary to draw upon. Like the lexicon of any metaphorical system, this one does not simply describe things, but shapes the way we sensed [sic] them: our vocabulary guides our thinking, urging us to interpret events according to and within the frame of that language. The lexicon of war raises the stakes of the discussion and generates intensity: war, after all, is about our very survival. What is this lexicon? Its nouns crucially define identities: "our side" has "an enemy" who becomes "the enemy." We have "adversaries" and "antagonists." These nouns define the people and countries involved in conflict primarily in terms of opposition: we are defined by who we are against, and our opponents are defined as our opposites; both sides are thus locked into roles of essential difference and eternal opposition. The verbs in our lexicon of war also perform this kind of ideological work. In war, we "attack," "defend," "strike," and "engage" the enemy; we develop tactics and strategic objectives and employ "necessary means." The verbs of war allow for glorious activity: we are not passive but active, not acted upon but acting. The verbs of war are, frankly, rather exciting: they support a sense of progress and movement, while they negate any undesirable self-picturing of ourselves as hesitant, static, or uncertain. They replace the role of victim with the more potent role of aggressive defender. In this vocabulary, we are defined as hunter rather than prey, warrior rather than victim. Even the adjectives of war have a significant effect: soldiers are strong, active, powerful agents, while civilians are less than this: less experienced, less knowing, less involved in the conflict first-hand, and therefore less deserving of a voice.

The lexicon of war tacitly endorses the military's valuing of hierarchy and authority. Within this model, as citizens, part of the price of our recovered security is to defer to those in government and military who are thought of [sic] as experts in the necessary deployments of war. This is significant because, in war, civilians have a limited importance relative to the martial arena: their job is to support the troops, not to question. The success of the war, we are told, requires singleness of vision and voice; a nation at war requires a harmonious chorus of support from its citizens, not a cacophony of dissenting voices. Any voice raised in protest, and thus out of tune with the prevailing chorus, is silenced, excoriated, or expelled. Voices of resistance or questioning are told, as the Dixie Chicks were famously told by an angry fan, to "shut up and sing."20

In this way the discourse of war enlists us into particular roles, and offers little space for the creative re-casting of these roles. The war metaphor offers the promise of victorious domination and protection: it implies we can so thoroughly defeat our enemies that we can keep them from ever hurting us again. This is a suspect promise, however; we have never successfully managed to fight the war to end all wars, and so clearly the closure and finality implicitly offered by the war metaphor is at least in part wishful thinking. Dochetty argues that the war on terror will be no exception: the difficulties of identifying and locating the terrorist perpetrators will make a final reprisal difficult, and the very military attacks that create refugees will create new enemies emerging from the crowded refugee camps, perpetuating "the cycle of fear and terror for our children and grandchildren."" The war metaphor thus serves us poorly pragmatically and strategically as well as ideologically: we hamper ourselves if we assume we understand the nature and motivation of our enemies, or if we assume we can predict their response to our activities. We hamper ourselves further if we don't examine the contexts and conditions that have given rise to the world's escalating cycles of unrest and violence.

Another important aspect of the war metaphor is its inherent selfjustification. It offers us a model that is reactive: our retaliation is right and, indeed, inevitable. We were given no choice in the matter, we might say to ourselves; we are in a war, this paradigm suggests, because others have declared war on us. Morally, the war metaphor risks everything a society builds by over-focusing resources on the war effort: "The great challenge of this metaphor is that it carries an all-or-nothing element. 'If you are not for war, you must be for doing nothing.' Without alternative models, critics of war do look weak and indecisive. Alternative metaphors are so badly needed. "22

Many who urge a cautious, critical, or reflective attitude towards the war on terror emphasize not only the metaphor's ideological work, but its powerful political effect. Lakoff and Frisch argue that the war metaphor was primarily adopted for political reasons. Susan Sontag argues that because of its indefinite "enemy," the anti ... terror war can never end, a "sign that it is not a war, but, rather, a mandate for expanding the use of American power. "23 The war metaphor allows for this expansion of power: when the government declares war on cancer or poverty or drugs it means the government is asking that new forces be mobilized to address the problem but when the government declares war on terrorism, it is giving itself permission to do what it wants. "When it wants to intervene somewhere, it will. It will brook no limits to its power."24 The war metaphor negates any other non-military possibility as a way to defend the country. Since national security is inextricably tied to the war's success, to be against the war is to be against the nation's very survival, and therefore to be a national threat. Within the war metaphor, any hesitation to support the war becomes unpatriotic.

While the war metaphor encourages the government to "do what it wants" internally, an equally important feature is the war metaphor's repressive powers domestically. Lakoff and Frisch insist that the war metaphor puts dissenters on the defensive, since hesitation to give the President fuller authority opens critics and Congress to charges of defeatism, weakness, and lack of patriotism. Once the military extends the field of battle, the war metaphor creates a new literal reality, one that substantiates and reinforces the original metaphor. The war metaphor offers the President enlarged wartime powers and confers on him an "extraordinary domestic power" to fulfill the "agenda of the radical right" in moving resources away from social needs towards military needs in over-riding environmental safeguards, and in establishing systems of surveillance and intimidation to influence both enemies and citizens.25 Since "war trumps all other topics," the war metaphor often expands powers not just in the international but in domestic arenas, granting the President a degree of power over political discussion as well as action.26 Sontag's editorial echoes these concerns, arguing for the explicit connection of the war metaphor to the subjugation of free, open political debate. Framing America's post-911 foreign policy as "actions undertaken in war time," she says, acts as "a powerful disincentive" to critical discussion: in the aftermath of the attacks, individuals objecting to "the jihad language used by the American government (good versus evil, civilization versus bar ... barism) were accused of condoning the attacks, or at least the legitimacy of the grievances behind the attacks. "27 Because the war metaphor elevates virtues such as solidarity and unanimity, even a simple call to reflectiveness "is equated with dissent, dissent with lack of patriotism."28 Within this model, reflection sides with the enemy, acting as a challenge to the "moral clarity" required to sustain a war.

The importance of how things are defined, then, cannot be underestimated. Frank Luntz advises right-wing organizations which words work best to sell their ideas to the public. He is credited with making estate taxes appear less palatable when he suggested they be re-named "death taxes." Through focus ... group research, Luntz found that "estate tax" wasn't an ob-jectionable concept to the majority of the public; it evoked a sense of wealthy people having to pay their fair share. The term "death tax," however, kindled voter resentment, calling up an image of government intruding into private family grief to snatch away the savings citizens wanted to pass along to loved ones. This word change had significant political impact: by provoking an outcry from a public who for the most part wouldn't be paying any significant amount in death taxes, the net result was a tax break for the wealthiest Americans. After the introduction of the new phrase, public support helped the Congress to repeal the tax. Economists observe that the repeal of the tax may cost more than a trillion dollars in lost revenue that could be used for much-needed social programs. Small words, then, clearly carry large consequences. In June 2004, Luntz wrote a memo for the Bush administration entitled Communicating the Principles of Prevention & Protection in the War on Terror, which offered guidance on specific language to use when talking about the war in Iraq. He notes: this document is intended to create a lexicon for explaining the policy of "preemption" and the "War in Iraq." However. you will not find any instance in 14 '\*' Chapter One which we suggest that you use the actual word "preemption," or the phrase "The War in Iraq" to communicate your policies to the American public. To do so is to undermine your message from the start. Preemption may be the right policy, and Iraq the right place to start. But those are not the right words to use.29 His advice was to connect the war on terror to the war in Iraq by ensuring that "no speech about homeland security or Iraq should begin without a reference to 9/11." Luntz's recommended phrases such as "It is better to fight the War on Terror on the streets of Baghdad than on the streets of New York or Washington" and "9/11 changed everything," became staples of Republican rhetoric. Luntz acknowledged the influence of the war paradigm, and how essential it was to domestic political control, when he stated that invoking the war on terror would establish the conditions for Bush's electoral win in 2004. "If the public thinks of [sic] what the President's doing as a war on terror, he wins. If they think of [sic] it as a war on Iraq, Kerry wins. What is the context of what the President is doing? Define it one way, you have one outcome; define it another way, you have a different outcome."30

Luntz's words suggest that governments may rise or fall on the meaning of a word, and that this meaning is determined by the context or frame in which the word circulates. The largest framing of the war on terror is a frame of race, and thus our most demeaning language and our harshest representations are reserved for those marked as racially Other. Evidence for this assertion can be found in the difference of language used to talk about internal voices of difference and those external Others who, as we draw them through our metaphoric language, are not just different but are defined by their difference. While the language used to denounce the "traitors" who publicly question the war on terror and American foreign policy is punitive, it still allows a basic value [sic] to those it denounces. "Quislings" are cowards, but they are cowardly persons; fifth columnists are dangerous and subversive, but dangerous and subversive people. These accusations attack groups' or individuals' actions, and the language of the accusations addresses these actions rather than the fundamental identity of the actor, who remains a fundamentally human agent. This goes against our historical sense that traitors are the worst kind of enemy because they destroy from within. Traditionally, traitors are thought of [sic] as far worse than external enemies. But the language of the war on terror does not bear this out. lnternal critics, while traitors, are allowed their value [sic]; the language and images associated with Arab terrorists, in comparison, relentlessly strips that value [sic] away. It achieves this by inextricably linking the "enemy other" with the animal-and not just any animal, but what we consider to be the lowest order of animal. War in general encour-ages imagery that debases the enemy, as follOWing chapters will show; perhaps the most important reason to resist the war metaphor, then, is that it goes forward upon a sustained and seductive devaluing [sic] of the enemy that, if we continue to indulge it, risks reducing our own value [sic].

#### The traditional conception of peace doesn’t exist – increased war powers conditions social systems to require declaring war on one population for peace for another – only reflective analysis on the state of war is effective

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It is not simply wrong to argue that the difference between war and its other is disappearing. There is plenty of evidence for the overlap between the practices of war and the practices of peace in the contemporary world. Yet, this view is not complete or complex enough to provide a truly telling insight into the problem of war, especially in its current form. I want now to turn to a series of thinkers who, while acknowledging the inter-penetration of war and its other in the contemporary world, have also provided a more nuanced account of how that complex is experienced or what it might mean.

Although he includes the War on Terror in his discussion, to Achille Mbembe, it is the colonial war that is the archetype of the state of war in the contemporary. In Mbembe, the distinction between war and peace, as well as between state and non-state combatants, has broken down, leaving the identity of war itself in crisis. This is the flipside of the crisis of the thinking of the social we derived at the end of our discussion of Derrida. The increasing difficulty of defining a clear distinction between war and its other produces a crisis in the definition of war as much as of the social.

Mbembe’s aim is to reveal a style of sovereignty whose function is not the achievement of political autonomy, but “the generalised instrumentalisation of human existence and the material destruction of human bodies and populations” (Mbembe, 2003, p. 14). He thus goes beyond accounts of sovereignty as the state of exception, arguing that this is a mere preliminary to the exercise of a “right to kill” (p. 16). Sovereignty then creates “death-worlds, new and unique forms of social existence in which vast populations are subjected to conditions of life conferring on them the status of living dead” (p. 40). Mbembe argues that one of the central critiques of modernity has focussed on the “complete conflation of war and politics” (p. 18), identified with Nazism. The historical origins of the logic the Nazis put into practice, however, is to be found in colonialism. The colonial—and later apartheid systems— gave rise to a “unique terror formation” displaying a “concatenation of biopower, the state of exception and the state of siege” (p. 22). Mbembe goes on: “the colony represents the site where sovereignty consists fundamentally in the exercise of a power outside the law . . . and where ‘peace’ is more likely to take on the face of a ‘war without end’ ” (p. 23). In this context, “the distinction between war and peace does not avail” (p.25). Colonial war does not simply aim at the pacification of the colony. War – whether enacted through explicit armed conflict or through the uninterrupted terrorisation of the local population, or through processes of administration that divide communities, uproot crops and orchards, hold populations in indefinite bureaucratic paralysis (at permit offices and check-points), disable economic relationships or explicitly arrest, detain and kill arbitrarily – becomes colonial normality. “The fiction of a distinction between ‘the ends of war’ and ‘the means of war’ collapses” (p. 25).

Mbembe evokes Deleuze and Guattari’s trope of the “war-machine” to describe the related death-world where warfare has become dissociated from the state. He uses Africa as an example:

Here, the political economy of statehood dramatically changed over the last quarter of the twentieth century. Many African states can no longer claim a monopoly on violence and on the means of coercion within their territory. Nor can they claim a monopoly on territorial boundaries. Coercion itself has become a market commodity. Military fighting power [sic] is bought and sold on a market in which the identity of suppliers and purchasers means almost nothing. Urban militias, private armies, armies of regional lords, private security firms, and state armies all claim the right to exercise violence or to kill. Neighbouring states or rebel movements lease armies to poor states. Nonstate deployers of violence supply two critical coercive resources: labour and minerals. Increasingly, the vast majority of armies are composed of citizen soldiers: child soldiers, mercenaries and privateers. (Mbembe, 2003, p. 32)

We have witnessed how such arrangements, entangled with struggles over resources destined for western markets, from diamonds to the opium poppy, quickly establish themselves in regions where the state has been destabilised and becomes only a bit-player, like Afghanistan and Iraq. It would be naïve to find [sic] such a model becoming generalised directly, but given that the consequences of climate change remain unpredictable, and the tenor of Mbembe’s argument is that what happens in the post-colonial world might be repeated in the supposedly developed world (colony prefigures camp), it would be foolish therefore to dismiss these developments as of only local interest.

Herfried Münkler picks up this very point in an account of The New Wars. Citing Trutz von Throta, Münkler speculates about whether the present state of war in Africa might say more about the future of the developed world than its past (Münkler, 2005, p. 34). The analogy between an autonomous, self-motivating and more or less continuous war that simply feeds off itself and the War on Terror—let alone the wars declared in western societies on drugs, crime, poverty and so on—is hard to resist. How does Münkler characterise these wars? They are first and foremost wars without noticeable beginning and achievable end. “They begin somehow or other, and end somewhere or other. Scarcely any of the parties can say clearly which purposes and aims are being pursued by means of the war” (p. 33). Many of the processes of the legitimate daylight global economy and culture feed this propensity to war. The new wars are fed by their “insertion into the process of economic globalisation or shadow globalisation, and the development of new constellations of interests geared not to the ending of war but to its theoretically endless continuation” (pp. 32–3). The distinction between combatants and non-combatants breaks down (p. 15), exposing women in particular to a sexual violence now used unambiguously as a weapon of terror and ethnic domination. Indeed, Münkler draws attention to “the extensive sexualisation of violence that is observable in nearly all the new wars” (p. 86). Strategic goals fade in the face of an “economy . . . of violence . . . one big torture machine whose purpose is to produce pain and suffering but not to enforce a political will” (p. 86).

This development in which war has become a self-generating activity is perhaps the most explicit repudiation we have met of Clausewitz’s instrumentalist account of warfare. Again, Münkler reads it as symptomatic of a structural crisis in contemporary sociality. The supposed modern rules of warfare, established at the end of the Thirty Years’ War, in which states co-existed inside agreed boundaries and exercised a monopoly on violence within their own territory, are really what is at stake in the new wars. A generalised and irregular warfare, which preceded the formation of the state, now returns at the other end of the period of rational warfare, where the state is starting to break down: [T]here is also the question of whether [the new wars] can in a sense be described as a return to a stage prior to Europe’s early modern statization of war; a look at that earlier period is a suitable way of bringing out similarities with the conditions in which the state is no longer what it was then not yet: the monopolist of war. (Münkler, 2005, p. 2)

This spread of war sweeps up even the organisations whose aim is to bring peace, such as international aid agencies, which get caught up in the economy of war by making resources available that can swiftly end up on the black market: “what was supposed to relieve hunger and poverty becomes a resource of war” (p. 18). Yet, this model of a continuous war “with neither an identifiable beginning or a clearly defined end” (p. 15) also describes wars in which states are now engaged. The war in Iraq and the War on Terror, as well as the generalised use of warfare as the language of social policy, prove [sic] the limits of the instrumentalist account of war. Torture, extraordinary rendition, imprecise bombing, rape, as well as the intensification of police action, legislation to restrict press freedom and civil and human rights more generally, all find [sic] the state spreading terror, executing arbitrary power, cultivating heightened social division and insinuating suspicion into social relations. It is, of course, arguable that this has always been a resource to which the state has easily and readily turned, and Derrida, for example, has argued that all states are by definition “rogue states” (Derrida, 2005). However, what we find [sic] now is not the use of these techniques in pursuit of specific social goals (economic, geopolitical or racial domination, for example), but as a substitute for sociality in general, in a social, even global, war without term. Terror becomes not a tool, but a form of continuous tension, from which some may profit, while others remain cowed. As Mbembe’s description of the Israeli occupation of Palestine outlines, this kind of war soon becomes normalised, a state of constant intimidation and emergency. The wars on drugs and crime that have dominated social policy in certain western countries achieve nothing more than this state of permanent unsettling of the social order.

Here, we find [sic] the historical realisation of a non-Clausewitzian version of war. The generalisation of war as a type of peace with peace’s aims shows that the deconstruction of the war/peace and friend/enemy dichotomies we have outlined in Derrida is not simply a piece of abstruse theorising. The historical situation in which we live is not one where war and its other are clear alternatives. Given we are in a perpetual state of low-level conflict in which acts of war and the rhetoric of the social combine with one another in complex ways, it is chimerical to even believe that the tangle can be rationalised into discrete alternatives wherein we can actually withdraw our troops, pressure our governments, discipline our corporations and pacify our popular culture in order to construct an enduring peace. As we have found [sic], this tangle persists in our understandings of what society is, even when they attempt to simplify it. Mbembe and Münkler show that this situation is not merely theoretical.

It is thus too simple to think of [sic] this complex state of affairs as simply the implementation of policy, as the widespread reference to Clausewitz would imply, nor as merely the erasure of difference between war and its other. The generalisation of war as Mbembe and Münkler describe it reveals a world in which the intensification of war in one place—one part of the world or fraction of society—has as its aim the consolidation of peace in another. Violence in the occupied zone or the failed state coincides with the uninhibited extension of luxury and security elsewhere. The sacralisation of the victims of the September 11 attacks, when viewed in a global context, is evidence of a society unable to believe that the violence it was accustomed to witness, even enact, elsewhere could be visited on its very heartland. The sense of outrage, even injustice, this provoked is illustrative of a global situation where violence is normalised but not evenly spread. The spreading administration of violence in one place is the securing of peace elsewhere, and it is this very contradiction that allows the violence to be rationalised. This then confirms the deconstructive account in which war and peace only attain their co-ordination because of the irreducible disjunction between them.

Our current conditions of war can’t be changed if we don’t seek to understand war itself.

War as a term can only be defined in relation to its opposite, such as peace, love, et cetera, BUT that opposite is always changing.

Rejection of war in favor of its opposites ignores how war is always fought in the name of realizing these states of peace.

The future will inevitably bring new social, political problems that will be impossible to address with one grand solution.

Instead we must understand war not as a stable concept but as ever evolving.

#### We must understand war as constantly evolving – attempting to strive for peace ignores that peace is always the goal of war – changing how we think war relates to the world creates a better understanding for how to resolve conflict

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The aim of this book has been to show that war is always defined in relation to something else, what we have called its other. This other may vary: it may be society, sovereign authority, politics, love, peace, friendship or something else. What is important about this relationship is not that it defines what war is opposite to and distinct from nor does it simply identify what the mechanism is that uses war as an instrument. It reveals the context within which war must emerge. This is not simply the historical or political context. Historical context is important, of course. Each thinker that we have studied can be said to be reacting to the specific war that defined or dominated their era: Hobbes, the religious and civil wars of the seventeenth century; Clausewitz, the wars of the revolutionary and Napoleonic era, in which the people became a major player for the first time; Freud, the First World War; Foucault, the war of the racial Holocaust; Virilio, the Cold War of Mutually Assured Destruction; Baudrillard, the First Gulf War; Žižek, the War on Terror and so on. Sometimes this address is direct and conscious; sometimes implicit and incidental. Their accounts, however, emerge in more than an historical context: they rely on a conceptual context as well, in which war is not just a literal material situation, but an abstraction or an idea. This is what makes war available as part of the unfolding of human meaning. In this way, war itself is not the problem. It is the way war is implicated in and required by other denominations of human meaning that condemns us to repeated bouts of official violence. War never emerges outside of a relationship to some conceptual other, and it is in the complexity of this relationship that our future fortunes of war will be determined.

As we have found [sic], this relationship can never be thought [sic] to stabilise simply around the idea that war and its other are opposites or merely continuous with one another. Even in the accounts of Hobbes and Kant, for example, the idea that war and civil society are opposites proves to be a much more complex argument than it at first appears: in the Hobbesian version, we find that civil society may seem to supplant the natural state of war, but is in fact, the fulfilment of war’s ostensible purposes. In Kant, peace emerges as a progression beyond war, but only by way of it. In both these arguments, the relationship between war and peace is not one of simple contrast, but of complex entanglement, in which peace never quite leaves war behind, indeed continues to depend on it. In our time, on the other hand, we find [sic]f a kind of Clausewitzian consensus, in which war is thought of [sic] as co-ordinated with both international diplomatic and domestic social policy, as a vast para-military police action in which unruly lapsed allies are disciplined or various kinds of social deviancy defined and excoriated. Theorists are quick to argue that what we find [sic] here is the increasing disappearance of any difference between war and its other. Yet, while this generalisation of war seems to be taking place, at no time has war been less publicly acceptable nor more automatically rejected—even indiscriminately and pre-emptively—by vast sections of the population. The generalised moral revulsion at war is not a real obstacle to war nor does it herald its demise. Indeed, while their constituents demonstrate against wars and ridicule them on blogs, politicians seem paralysed when it comes to contesting the determination of heads of government to resort to warfare. As Ryan C Hendrickson has argued in The Clinton Wars: The Constitution, Congress and War Powers (Hendrickson, 2002), the US Congress has been increasingly reluctant to resist the will of a president who has decided on military action, even when it has the constitutional power to do so. The general revulsion at war therefore is not necessarily incompatible with a generalisation of war in practice. Indeed, my aim has been to show the opposite: that the general deployment and the general rejection of war are part of a single complex. It is much too simple, however, to find [sic] this complex as part of a willing ignorance [sic] on the part of the bulk of humanity, wherein moral comfort and self-regard would be assured by rejection of war even though affluent lifestyles may depend on war for their continued opportunity. It is too easy to think of [sic] the war problem simply morally, that we play at rejecting wars from which we are actually happy to profit. Our rejection of war, like our purported commitment to democracy and human rights, is not merely hypocritical. It must be understood as part of a complex in which war and its other emerge together in a double relationship in which they both encourage and refuse one another: we reject war because it ruins social relations, shatters bodies and savages our human rights. Yet, we also look to war to preserve the social, protect threatened lives and enlarge rights. War kills and saves simultaneously. It destroys the things in the name of which it is implemented. To think of [sic] a loss of difference between war and its other is to overlook the complex situations in which war emerges and which keep it alive despite our moral repugnance and endless official lamentations for those of us whom it has annihilated.

To say that war is double and that it is implicated conceptually in other values that we want to preserve is not to simply say that we should be resigned to war enduring. It is an attempt to provide a new and useful way by which war can be understood, and argues, as all analysis does, that material situations like war cannot be dealt with if they are not understood, and that new ways must continually be sought to rethink them. Theory is not an enduring ideal truth to be applied to practical situations, but the invention of new conceptual forms that may help us represent and explain hitherto obscure or enigmatic phenomena. Thinking of war in terms of the war/other complex means always understanding [sic] the emergence of war as the deployment of something else with it. The two must always appear in relationship with one another even if they are considered to be antagonistic or mutually destructive. So war and whatever its other might be in a particular context, facilitate the emergence of one another, even in their defiance of one another. It is this inseparability of war and its other that makes it possible to understand [sic] war and its other as co-ordinated. What was Nazi war but a tribute, in its most organised and exultant murderousness, to life? What was Communist insurgency but the most regimented and anonymous embrace of the possibilities of freedom? And what are democracy’s post-1989 wars but the most brutal and oppressive attempt to spread human rights?

These complex situations can and should not be disguised by an eternal but vacuous resort to morality. The logic that attributes the doubleness of war to hypocrisy is a singularly unenlightening example of the ascendancy of moral discourse in discussions of war. Of course, our attitude to war must be moral: we could not protect ourselves from the cult of official violence if it were not, nor could we begin to understand [sic] war as a problem and something to be surpassed, something I have assumed as relatively uncontentious from the outset. Yet, because war is politically, economically, and above all, conceptually situated, it must be recognised not as primarily a moral, but a political problem. Since the Vietnam War, resistance to war has been fundamentally based on revulsion at its violence and destructiveness and the popular culture that naturalise it. This resistance has been primarily rhetorical and gestural, as it befits its interest in the aesthetics of war and in tune with the general aestheticisation of politics of the time. It has rested on general humanist clichés about community, fraternity and an ideal social future. In other words, it has relied on a banal and unsustainable understanding of the mutual alienation of the human and war. This conception is not wrong in any simple sense, but it is too uncomplicated to deal with the dynamics of the war/other complex, in which the human can be as much a justification for war as reason for scepticism towards it, and is indeed probably both. To engage with war properly, we have to realise that this kind of opposition is not enough. When war is in play, so is something else, war’s various others. Humanist sentimentality often attempts to present what we have identified as war’s others as unquestionable or non-negotiable: How can we possibly contest the value implicit in love, or sociality or human rights? Is not this the worst kind of post-modern relativism, in which we allow what should be absolute values to be held up for debate? Yet it is these various “values” that accompany and facilitate the emergence of war, and that always wrong-foot us when we attempt to reject it. Do we not want dictators to be removed, women’s rights restored and ethnic cleansing resisted? If we are in favour of these goals, how can we resist the wars that aim to achieve them? Does not this make the rejection of war merely automatic and adolescent?

The refusal to debate these values results in both an impotent and unworldly rejection of war, on the one hand, and a mindless acquiescence to it, on the other. The argument of this book has been that it is necessary to understand the complexity of the implication of such values in war. This understanding requires the courage to rethink these values and the political will to engage unsentimentally with their historical function. Questioning war must involve a questioning of the very things in the name of which wars are fought, not in order simply to reject them, but to engage properly with their real historical and political function. If you are unwilling to deal with this dynamic and seek mere recourse to absolute rejections of war, or absolute endorsement of the values that oppose (and/or allow) war, then you risk remaining stuck in the cycle from which politics should always be attempting to free us. Just because they have failed us and have proven corrupt, easily intimidated and willingly compromised, we should not exempt parliaments from being one place amongst others where such politics should take place. In short, wherever it happens, the politics of war must also provide a properly critical account of war’s other.

Our inherited models of politics have opted either for the grand narrative approach to the realisation of optimal ideological goals or else a molecularism, in which social fractions either withstand or disrupt the forces attempting to limit them. The first relies on a model of a uniform and collective trajectory of human development, which can no longer be sustained, as well as having a weak understanding of what Foucault so ably identified as the “regional” (Foucault, 2003, p. 27) way in which power operates. The second fails to produce more general insight into the dynamics of human collectivity, the politics of the economic in particular. The pitting of these two models of politics against one another defined post-modern debate. Yet, we may be now confronting a political epoch in which neither of these ways of thinking about politics helps us: the first because it aims to recover an older sense of human universality that is long gone, irrecoverable, ineffective and probably already unlamented; the second because the radical disruption of identity and administration, however relevant it remains to challenging the silent violence of culture, policy and social institutions, will not reassemble the sites of collective intention, scrutiny and negotiation that we will need in order to deal with the challenges of the politics of climate change—economic activity discovering its final limits, the resulting dislocation of human populations inequitably experienced, the threat of states acting unilaterally to secure their interests regardless of the consequences and so on. What we will be confronting will be a series of situations that will not be easily assimilable to theoretical models developed in wholly different contexts, co-ordinated as they were, first, with the expansion and, then, the contraction of Western historicity. This future could well produce a set of unfolding or overlapping crises in which wars develop. It will be absolutely crucial to understand the dynamic behind these wars: What are they being fought for? It may be true that globalisation will not result in the liquidation of the nation state, as Hirst and others have argued. Yet, in the twenty-first century, however pragmatically persistent the nation state may be, it lacks any enduring sense of natural inevitability, and contests with economic, religious and ethnic allegiances which may co-ordinate with it—from the potentially unknowable flows of capital through an increasingly abstract financial market to the bonds of fundamentalist dogmatism— but which may overwhelm it as well. There is and will continue to be a remaking of the plural relationships that will cluster around a set of unrecognisable warfares. War will not perhaps be the instrument of established social collectivities or an expression of their values, but the thing that brings them into existence in the first place, inventing ideological and dogmatic formations hitherto unknown, or loose coalitions of established national and international institutions. Who will fight which wars in the name of what? As we have found [sic], what gives rise to a war, what justifies it can also define the very point of view from which it can be resisted, not that our attitude to war should always and everywhere be simply one of refusal. Economic security, political rights and even peace are examples of the double constructs in the name of which war can be both defended and critiqued.

My argument is that, given the unpredictability of our political future and the superannuation of the political models we have inherited, a theoretical construct like the war/other complex may provide one way in which future situations may be thought not ideologically but pragmatically. Traditionally war has been treated as if it is a discrete event, anticipated by causes and followed by consequences, but a singular thing nevertheless. The war/other complex allows us to think of [sic] war in its embeddedness in the unfolding of global social relations in general. In this way, it may not only provide a more pragmatic way of understanding a future politics, but by reinventing new ways of imagining the collective and the specific dynamic by which it may subsume individual bodies and events, it may take over the function of our previous political paradigms.

#### Metaphor is everywhere and unavoidable BUT there are certain metaphors that are detrimental.

The argument-as-war metaphor utilized by debate becomes a form of rhetorical violence that puts participants and critics at odds with each other.

The metaphorical guides the literal as conceptions of argument-as-war makes it so.

Lakoff and Johnson, ‘80 [George Lakoff, Richard and Rhoda Goldman Distinguished Professor of Cognitive Science and Linguistics at the University of California at Berkeley; Mark Johnson, Knight Professor of Liberal Arts and Sciences in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Oregon; excerpt from "Metaphors We Live By"; http://theliterarylink.com/metaphors.html]

Metaphor is for most people device of the poetic imagination and the rhetorical flourish--a matter of extraordinary rather than ordinary language. Moreover, metaphor is typically viewed as characteristic of language alone, a matter of words rather than thought or action. For this reason, most people think they can get along perfectly well without metaphor. We have found, on the contrary, that metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in language but in thought and action. Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature.

The concepts that govern our thought are not just matters of the intellect. They also govern our everyday functioning, down to the most mundane details. Our concepts structure what we perceive, how we get around in the world, and how we relate to other people. Our conceptual system thus plays a central role in defining our everyday realities. If we are right in suggesting that our conceptual system is largely metaphorical, then the way we thinks what we experience, and what we do every day is very much a matter of metaphor.

But our conceptual system is not something we are normally aware of. in most of the little things we do every day, we simply think and act more or less automatically along certain lines. Just what these lines are is by no means obvious. One way to find out is by looking at language. Since communication is based on the same conceptual system that we use in thinking and acting, language is an important source of evidence for what that system is like.

Primarily on the basis of linguistic evidence, we have found that most of our ordinary conceptual system is metaphorical in nature. And we have found a way to begin to identify in detail just what the metaphors are halt structure how we perceive, how we think, and what we do.

To give some idea of what it could mean for a concept to be metaphorical and for such a concept to structure an everyday activity, let us start with the concept ARGUMENT and the conceptual metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR. This metaphor is reflected in our everyday language by a wide variety of expressions:

ARGUMENT IS WAR

Your claims are indefensible.

He attacked every weak point in my argument.

His criticisms were right on target.

I demolished his argument.

I've never won an argument with him.

you disagree? Okay, shoot!

If you use that strategy, he'll wipe you out.

She [sic] shot down all of my arguments.

It is important to know [sic] that we don't just talk about arguments in terms of war. We can actually win or lose arguments. We think of [sic] the person we are arguing with as an opponent. We attack his positions and we defend our own. We gain and lose ground. We plan and use strategies. If we find a position indefensible, we can abandon it and take a new line of attack. Many of the things we do in arguing are partially structured by the concept of war. Though there is no physical battle, there is a verbal battle, and the structure of an argument--attack, defense, counter-attack, etc.---reflects this. It is in this sense that the ARGUMENT IS WAR metaphor is one that we live by in this culture; its structures the actions we perform in arguing. Try to imagine a culture where arguments are not viewed in terms of war, where no one wins or loses, where there is no sense of attacking or defending, gaining or losing ground. Imagine a culture where an argument is viewed as a dance, the participants are thought of [sic] as performers, and the goal is to perform in a balanced and aesthetically pleasing way. In such a culture, people would view arguments differently, experience them differently, carry them out differently, and talk about them differently. But we would probably not view them as arguing at all: they would simply be doing something different. It would seem strange even to call what they were doing "arguing." In perhaps the most neutral way of describing this difference between their culture and ours would be to say that we have a discourse form structured in terms of battle and they have one structured in terms of dance. This is an example of what it means for a metaphorical concept, namely, ARGUMENT IS WAR, to structure (at least in part) what we do and how we understand what we are doing when we argue. The essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another.. It is not that arguments are a subspecies of war. Arguments and wars are different kinds of things--verbal discourse and armed conflict--and the actions performed are different kinds of actions. But ARGUMENT is partially structured, understood, performed, and talked about in terms of WAR. The concept is metaphorically structured, the activity is metaphorically structured, and, consequently, the language is metaphorically structured.

Moreover, this is the ordinary way of having an argument and talking about one. The normal way for us to talk about attacking a position is to use the words "attack a position." Our conventional ways of talking about arguments presuppose a metaphor we are hardly ever conscious of. The metaphors not merely in the words we use--it is in our very concept of an argument. The language of argument is not poetic, fanciful, or rhetorical; it is literal. We talk about arguments that way because we conceive of them that way--and we act according to the way we conceive of thing

The most important claim we have made so far is that metaphor is not just a matter of language, that is, of mere words. We shall argue that, on the contrary, human thought processes are largely metaphorical. This is what we mean when we say that the human conceptual system is metaphorically structured and defined. Metaphors as linguistic expressions are possible precisely because there are metaphors in a person's conceptual system. Therefore, whenever in this book we speak of metaphors, such as ARGUMENT IS WAR, it should be understood that metaphor means metaphorical concept.

THE SYSTEMATICITTY OF METAPHORICAL CONCEPTS

Arguments usually follow patterns; that is, there are certain things we typically do and do not do in arguing. The fact that we in part conceptualize arguments in terms of battle systematically influences the shape argument stake and the way we talk about what we do in arguing. Because the metaphorical concept is systematic, the language we use to talk about that aspect of the concept is systematic.

We saw in the ARGUMENT IS WAR metaphor that expressions from the vocabulary of war, e.g., attack a position, indefensible, strategy, new line of attack, win, gain ground, etc., form a systematic way of talking about the battling aspects of arguing. It is no accident that these expressions mean what they mean when we use them to talk about arguments. A portion of the conceptual network of battle partially characterizes file concept of an argument, and the language follows suit. Since metaphorical expressions in our language are tied to metaphorical concepts in a systematic way, we can use metaphorical linguistic expressions to study the nature of metaphorical concepts and to gain an understanding of the metaphorical nature of our activities.

#### Vote aff to affirm the instability of “war.”

Just like there’s no one perfect definition of war, there’s no perfect definition of debate; the activity constitutes a multitude of different things in various contexts.

#### The meaning behind language is not stagnant, but instead constantly fluctuating.

There are a vast number of replacements to the metaphor of argument as war. Instead of choosing just one, we should expand our rhetorical possibilities and never end the search for how to define and relate to debate.

Cohen, ’95 [Daniel H. Cohen, Ph.D., Philosophy, Indiana University. Professor of Philosophy at Colby College; “Argument is War ... and War is Hell: Philosophy, Education, and Metaphors for Argumentation”; Informal Logic Vol. 17, No.2 (Spring 1995)]

To be sure, there are alternative understandings of argumentation available. I think it completely justified to speak of the progress that has been made in characterizing argumentation by exploiting the resources of speech act theory, critical theory, formal logic, rhetorical analysis, and all the other relevant conceptual tools at our disposal. To take one example, arguments can be characterized in terms of their various linguistic roles or in terms of their effects as conversational episodes. From that perspective, one of the primary functions of an argument is "enhancing the acceptability of the speech act for which it is an argument."9 What I like about this particular formula, besides its succinct elegance, is how it abstracts to a level from which the adversarial element can be regarded as merely an accidental means to a more important end, and thereby allows for other means to that end. It creates room for answers to the question of why someone might seek arguments for something she already believes; the argument-is-war metaphor does not. It also endorses the possibility of arguing/or something without arguing against anybody; and again, the argument-is-war metaphor cannot accommodate that. Specifically, explanations qualify as arguments under this conception, and this seems meet since explanations constitute a large part of many arguments. Explanation can indeed serve as a kind of justification, and justification generally is the province of argument.

This points to a way to articulate the connection between interpretation and argumentation that was suggested earlier: in order to understand some texts, a certain kind of sympathetic reading can be necessary. This might involve speculating about an author's motives, providing a charitable interpretation for apparently inconsistent passages, or the like. From the perspective provided by thinking of arguments along the speech-act lines just presented, reading looks a lot like arguing with the author. Readers need to argue with, meaning alongside, the author rather than with, meaning against, the author, in order to enhance whatever it is that the text is saying, showing, or doing. And, needless to say, authors and readers do not have to be adversaries. The "argument" between them is not adversarial. This is not, to be sure, how students of philosophy are typically taught to read a philosophical text. They are trained to read "critically," Le., they are trained to read with a combatant's eye, an eye that is open for any weaknesses in the argument that can be turned to advantage in a critical paper. All too often we read the way we argue in another respect: we read with "our defenses up" lest we be convinced of something we didn't want to believe. "I'll be damned if I'm going to let this author teach me something new!" Since this is not the attitude we want in the classroom, we should think along different lines:

(1) Argument is not war; it is reciprocal reading.

Speech-act approaches have shown that they can shed light on the subject of argumentation. Unfortunately, what should be understood as helpful characterizations are all too often interpreted as definitive analyses or necessary and sufficient conditions, Le., as definitions. These can then be taken as challenges to other workers in the field to find or construct both counterexamples that should belong to the category but do not fit the description, and counterexamples that do fit the description but should not count as arguments. For the example at hand, it might be pointed out that one way of enhancing a speech act is to say it with a smile, but that should hardly count as an argument. Or, again, revising a poem seems a clear example of a speech-act-enhancing activity that is just as clearly not an argument. Arguments may include interpretations, but that does not make all interpreters into arguers. Conversely, when I tell my son to wear his seat belt, and answer his question, "Why?" by offering appropriate reasons, I am not arguing for or enhancing the acceptability of any speech-act, except under some ad hoc reading, although I am certainly arguing for some act: his buckling his seat belt. While it is certainly helpful to have as wide a variety of examples as possible at hand, this can degenerate into an esoteric exercise, indeed an idle academic exercise of exactly the same sort of nit-picking that I have just done with the counter-examples here. I have taken a very illuminating characterization and managed to show that, being very, very legalistic, it is, to no one's surprise, inadequate as a definition. What we need are not new definitions, but new metaphors. Fortunately, Aristotle was wrong in thinking that metaphor is the work of genius. On the contrary, metaphor is a linguistic commonplace, something that every competent language user understands and employs (although, to be sure, creating the brilliant metaphors that permanently reshape our thoughts is no mean feat).

I sometimes think that what good philosophizing and, more generally, effective teaching of any kind have in common is that they revolve around the same kind of activity: the search for just the right metaphor. Metaphors are more than merely elliptical similes or stylistic affectations for embellished expression. They are vehicles for making the unfamiliar familiar, which is what makes them particularly important for education. There is, however, something funny about characterizing metaphors as linguistic devices for articulating unfamiliar thoughts by transplanting them into a more familiar context: it buys into the questionable dichotomy of thought and language. The implied model is that we think things, and then we somehow translate them into written or spoken words. Thinking and speaking or writing are not nearly as easily distinguishable as this model suggests. There is some wisdom in the old chestnut "How am I supposed to know what I think until I hear what I have to say?" Metaphors are not just elegant or clever ways of conveying new thoughts; they are also ways of thinking new thoughts, of grasping those thoughts, and even of formulating them in the first place. And this is what makes the art of metaphor so important for philosophy. Because I think of both philosophy and education this way, I think the question that we really should be addressing is not where and how arguments fit into philosophy and education, but what metaphors for arguments fit in with the goals of philosophy and education. It is especially appropriate to ask the question in this form when philosophy and education are being sung in a Pragmatist key.

The meaning of a metaphor is invariably, and notoriously, under-determined. This is what stymies reading them as elliptical similes. Sure, arguments are like war, but how? Everything is like everything else in some respect, if we are but clever enough to sense [sic] it. Arguments are rafts on the sea of uncertainty carrying us to the terra firma of truth. Arguments are verbal dances responding to inaudible Gricean rhythms and unknown Jungian syllogisms. Arguments are the mortar holding together the bricks out of which theories are built. Arguments are mental exercises for athletes of the intellect. It is not hard, I think, to make sense out of any of these metaphors, but it is an amazing ability nonetheless. Interpreting metaphors is nearly the art that creating them is.

In some respects, interpreting metaphors may actually be the greater art. The exercise of creating metaphors can with relatively little effort be extended indefinitely. Even restricting ourselves just to traffic metaphors (and getting carried away with the exercise), we can say that arguments are (i) conversational traffic jams-(ii) gridlock with a lot of honking and little movement; (iii) arguments are conversational traffic accidents; (iv) they are wrong turns, or (v) detours, or (vi) dead ends or (vii) roundabouts on the streets of discourse; or should we have said that they are (viii) short cuts to the truth at the end of the road; maybe (ix) they are long and winding roads to nowhere; or, instead, we can conceive of arguments as (x) intellectual one way roads to their conclusionsalthough maybe they are really (xi) one-lane roads but with two-way traffic. More positively, they can be thought of as a case of (xii) a merging traffic of ideas or even better as (xiii) conceptual roads under construction.

Conceptual connections like these can be constructed almost at will. The list can be expanded, if not ad infinitum, then at least ad nauseam, so that almost any arbitrarily constructed metaphor, even an initially inscrutable one, such as that arguments are the road kill alongside the highways of life (ad nauseam indeed!), can be made intelligible and plausible: both arguments and road kill are to be avoided, they are the tragic end for those who innocently enter areas of high traffic, they are what can happen when we aren't careful, and so on. Admittedly, this is stretching the point, but that is exactly what metaphors do so well. Still, the fact that so many traffic metaphors are so readily available suggests that they identify an important set of features about arguments, viz., something about their internal dynamics and the possible interactions that can arise from them.

In contrast to the argument-as-traffic metaphors, the argument-is-war metaphor makes a different point. What it emphasizes (or creates!) is the adversarial aspect of argumentation, which is why this particular metaphor is objectionable in the classroom. But, interpretation being an art, other conclusions could also be drawn from the metaphor. There will always be an indefinitely large supply of abstractable similarities between the tenor and vehicle of a metaphor, wars and arguments in this case. Wars may involve more than just two parties, but never less than two, and we usually assume that this is true of arguments as well; wars can be ended by simple agreement of the parties involved, and so can arguments; wars are occasions that test the national resolve and sense of identity, while arguments can do the same for the individual; wars need not end with a winner and a loser, because both sides might claim victory, when in fact both sides may have lost a great deal, and there is surely a counterpart for arguments.

Of course, there are also great differences that might be offered as counterexamples or counterbalances to the value of this metaphor. Wars can be prevented by diplomatic efforts, so they represent a failure of diplomacy. Arguments are not always symptomatic of communicative failure. Often they are the expressly intended product of rational inquiry! Indeed, if we include rational discourse under the rubric "diplomacy," then it is precisely arguments as we "officially" conceive them that can best prevent wars! Wars can be prevented by arguing, but arguing, obviously, cannot. Argument, as rational engagement, is antithetical to military engagement, and the metaphor would then have to be thought of [sic] as an ironic reversal. (Then again, if fighting for peace can make sense, so might arguing for agreement.) If arguments are to be a positive way of addressing differences, then

(2) Argument is not war; it is diplomatic negotiation.

Two of these just-mentioned features common to war and argument merit particular attention. First, wars never end up where they started. The status quo ante bellum can never really be achieved. What starts out as a war of principle, especially when successful, might well end up as a war of conquest, and, conversely, the unsuccessful war for conquest is transformed into a war of principle. Successful defensive re-actions inevitably seek to pre-empt any possible future transgressions. What, for example, was the American Civil War all about? The Vietnam War? The Gulf War? The answers that today's history books offer differ from the answers given by those wars' own contemporaries.

Something very similar happens in arguments, especially when they are thought of as verbal wars. Interestingly, Imre Lakatos has made just this point with respect to mathematical proofs, the very paradigms for the "official" picture of arguments as exercises in pure reason. IO Proofs and refutations, he argued, are two parts of the same dialectical process. Counter-examples to proposed theorems, he maintained, do not in general function as real refutations. Rather, the role they most often play in mathematics is to demand further clarification of the intended range of the thesis or to seek greater articulation in the definitions of the concepts used. The theorems that result from, or survive, this process are inevitably changed by the process. That is, what a proof is "all about" changes as the proof proceeds, and this is no less applicable to other kinds of arguments.

(3) Thus, argument is not war; it is growth or adaptation.

Wittgenstein reached a very similar conclusion about mathematical proofs, albeit for different reasons. II A proof, he asserted, never proves what it set out to prove. Proofs establish new conceptual connections between the thesis in question and other parts of the system of mathematics. These connections are constitutive of the meanings of the concepts involved, so the meaning of the sentence proved always has new semantic-conceptual accretions. Therefore, the sentence that has been proved, the theorem, can never have exactly the same meaning as the sentence to be proved, despite their typographic identity. In just the same way, to revert to an earlier example, no poem can really ever be revised because any revisions would, in a very real sense, result in a new and different poem. Is there a way to think of arguments as altering, or even constructing, new meanings? That is, can what an argument is "all about" be subject to the same sorts of historiographic revisions as the casus belli? It seems so.

(4) That is, argument is not war; it is metamorphosis.

The other feature common to wars and arguments I want to note is that they are multiple-agent events (or, at least, multi-voice events, to accommodate those of us who habitually argue with themselves). It takes more than one party to start a war or an argument, it takes more than one party to sustain a war or argument, and it also takes more than one to finish a war or argument. Just as a war is never really over until both sides agree to a cessation of hostilities-otherwise there will be a prolonged guerrilla war, permanent tensions, or an uneasy truce without real peace-so too an argument is never really over until some sort of consensus has been achieved-lest there be continued verbal sniping, simmering resentments, or a lingering grudge beneath the surface. Arguments might result in situations that are analogous to the results of wars, but there is also the possibility that they end otherwise. Arguments may result in an exchange of ideas, rather than just the imposition of one side's ideas on the other. And this is certainly a legitimate pedagogical role for arguments. In the classroom, then,

(5) Argument should not even be like war; it should be a kind of cross-pollination, leading to hybridization.

Alternatively, arguments can end in with the construction of a new conceptual order, as the Second World War gave birth to the United Nations. Ideally, in seminar

(6) Argument is not at all war; it is brainstorming.

The best arguments, then, rather than being destructively adversarial, involve a constructive co-operation between their participants. If debate is to be contstructive for everyone involved, then

(7) Instead of being a kind of war, argument can be more like a barnraising.

Although the language of warfare is so readily used to describe arguments, there is a difference that is both obvious and important, but still easy to overlook: arguments, like brainstorming sessions or barn-raisings, can be desirable in a way that wars cannot. If we focus on the possible outcomes rather than the origins, the ends rather than the beginnings, then one way to conceptualize arguments is as those events in rational discourse that tend to create or lead to consensus. This combines the transformative-constructivist aspect with the multiple-agency aspect of arguments in a way that accommodates the move from philosophy as the pursuit-of-truth to philosophy as the pursuit-of-wisdom by shifting the balance in emphasis from (to borrow a phrase from Richard Rorty) objectivity to solidarity, while simultaneously respecting the possibility of non-competitive or even cooperative argumentation for educational ends. Simply put: "Let's hash it out" does not have to mean "let's fight it out."

Perhaps arguments are more like town meetings than anything else, because they are sometimes contentious, but sometimes co-operative; there may be several opposing factions, or only interested but as yet undecided citizens; sometimes they are divisive and inconclusive, but sometimes they are indeed constructive; they may begin with a consensus for action, and serve merely as strategy sessions for orchestrating actions, or they may begin with a cacophony of voices-and end the same way.

For all its openness to the variety of forms arguments can take, the purposes they can serve, and the many possible outcomes that can result from them, in the end, I don't think the town-meeting metaphor serves very well. It will not challenge the argument-is-war metaphor, if only because town meetings do not occupy as prominent a place in our conceptual geography as war. War is, however, a dangerous metaphor, particularly when it has been allowed to form, to deform, argumentation in the classroom. Other metaphors are available, and still others that are even better are waiting to be created, but in the end I am skeptical that any single metaphor can fit all the shapes that arguments take or serve all the purposes that arguments serve. In that case, we do not really need to come up with a new metaphor to reflect and reform our practice; we need instead to traffic in as many metaphors as possible-including all those traffic metaphors!

# 2AC

# Case

### ---2AC AT Apolitical

#### Aff reclaims politics – current system isn’t capable of meaningful solutions without

#### Sokoloff ‘5 [Political Research Quarterly Vol. 58, No. 2 (Jun., 2005) “Between Justice and Legality: Derrida on Decision” William W. Sokoloff pp. 341-352]

#### Derrida places imperatives of paradox in the heart of the legal order in order to connect political action to a higher conception of responsibility but without abandoning the need for political action today. For Derrida, politics does not happen when one follows a program or when one dreams about an impossible notion of justice but in the non-programmatic interface between justice and legality. His re-conceptualization of decision is a strategy intended to make political decisions more difficult but without abandoning the call for more responsible modes of political action. He prevents us from deciding too quickly but also rules out as irresponsible the deferral of decision. He breaks the unhelpful opposition between premature action and irresponsible indifference in the name of more responsible modes of engagement. Even if I have somewhat arbitrarily brought Derrida and Rawls's work into contact in this essay; Derrida attempts to rescue the word politics from the weakening [sic] malaise that has resulted from the cramped political imagination and narrow view of citizenship that we can see in Rawls. Signs at the exhaustion of politics are the signs of our time: a narrowing of credible political alternatives that have rendered elections almost irrelevant, the corporate domination of the political sphere that casts an ominous shadow over the voter, the disappearance of substantive dialogue, the gag order on dissent, widespread apathy, dubious unilateral foreign ventures, a crisis in education and health care, public contempt for politicians; and little faith that anything can be done to address this. Interpreted affirmatively, decision is a strategy of political renewal. It creates an extralegal ethical space from which one can launch a permanent critique of the legal order. This permanent critique appears as a spontaneous politics that cannot be represented by a party or a leader. Like Socrates in Apology (Plato 200:3) it is annoying, defiant, and it stings; but unlike him in Crito (Plato 2003) it never passively submits to state power. This spontaneous politics is the scourge of tyrants and their flatterers. As Sheldon Wolin (1996. 37) reminds us, citizenship is more than merely following the rules of a particular legal order; for him, "democracy is born in transgressive acts."

# Cap

### FW Contradicts Cap

#### Framework is a double turn with cap – alternative must escape control – proves the inauthenticity of the alternative and means the perm solves.

#### Invisible Committee 1

The Invisible Committee. The Cybernetic Hypothesis. 2001

But that also means that its first objective must be to resist all attempts to reduce it away with demands for representation. Fog is a vital response to the imperative of clarity, transparency, which is the first imprint of imperial power on bodies. To become foglike means that I finally take up the part of the shadows that command me and prevent me from believing all the fictions of direct democracy insofar as they intend to ritualize the transparency of each person in their own interests, and of all persons in the interests of all. To become opaque like fog means recognizing that we don't represent anything, that we aren't identifiable; it means taking on the untotalizable character of the physical body as a political body; it means opening yourself up to still-unknown possibilities. It means resisting with all your power any struggle for recognition. Lyotard: "What you ask of us, theoreticians, is that we constitute ourselves as identities, as managers. But if there's one thing we're sure of, it's that this operation (of exclusion) is just a cheap show, that incandescences are made by no one, and belong to no one." Nevertheless, it won't be a matter of reorganizing a few secret societies or conquering conspiracies like free-masonry, carbonarism, as the avant-gardes of the last century envisioned - I'm thinking mostly of the College of Sociology. Establishing a zone of opacity where people can circulate and experiment freely without bringing in the Empire's information flows, means producing "anonymous singularities," recreating the conditions for a possible experience, an experience which will not be immediately flattened out by a binary machine assigning a meaning/direction to it, a dense experience that can transform desires and the moments where they manifest themselves into something beyond desire, into a narrative, into a filled-out body. So, when Toni Negri asked Deleuze about communism, the latter was careful not to assimilate it into a realized and transparent communication: "you ask whether societies of control or communication would give rise to forms of resistance capable of giving a new chance for a communism conceived as a 'transverse organization of free individuals.' I don't know; perhaps. But this would be impossible if minorities got back hold of the megaphone. Maybe words, communication, are rotten. They're entirely penetrated by money: not by accident, but by their nature. We have to detourn/misuse words. Creating has always been something different from communicating. The important thing is maybe to create vacuoles of non-communication, interrupters who escape control." Yes, the important thing for us is to have opacity zones, opening cavities, empty intervals, black blocs within the cybernetic matrix of power. The irregular war waged against the Empire, on the level of a given place, a fight, a riot, from now on will start with the construction of opaque and offensive zones. Each of these zones shall be simultaneously a small group/nucleus starting from which one might experiment without being perceptible, and a panic-propagating cloud within the ensemble of the imperial system, the coordinated war machine, and spontaneous subversion at all levels. The proliferation of these zones of offensive opacity (ZOO), and the intensification of their interrelations, will give rise to an irreversible disequilibrium.

### 2AC

#### Perm – vote aff and endorse historical materialism.

#### Perm solves – must experiment to find methods of subversion – totalizing conceptions of the “global capitalist system” doom alt solvency.

Connolly, ‘11 [William Connolly, 2011, review quotes of his book “a world of becoming”, <http://obsoletematter.wordpress.com/2011/07/06/william-connolly-a-world-of-becoming/>]

Specific cultural priorities, habits of family life, religious belief and ritual, underground markets, new social movements, tax evasion,cross-state political formations, military reticence or adventurism, media humor and drama, scientific research and teaching all posses partial and shifting degrees of autonomy from system governance. To insist that every practice, once capitalism expands its reach, is entirely absorbed into its orbit is to translate the idea of a world-capitalist system into that of a totality. Such an image exaggerates the absorptive power of one system, and discourages exploration of ways to stretch and challenge global capitalism in creative ways. It promotes either a response of managing the system without modifying its trajectory, or of preparing a revolutionary movement, or of waiting passively for it to burst into flames of its own accord. That is, to translate a world-capitalist system into a totality is to misread what is outside it, to miss those things imperfectly incorporated into it, and to present an apolitical orientation to it.

#### Clear the ground first – deconstructing outdated concepts and starting afresh solves best, otherwise our old remedies become hegemonic

Galli 10, Carlo Galli, Professor of Political Philosophy at the Univeristy of Bologna, Politics Spaces and Global War, trans. Adam Sitze, p. 188

Rather than denying the theoretico-political novelty of Global War, ratherthan closing our eyes to the fact that Global War radically challengesmodern political philosophy and its categories, and rather than continuing to believe that globalization is not the horizon that determines ourexperience today, our task is to begin to think the novelties, the paradoxes and the aporiac of globalization. We must ask ourselves about its possibilities—not in order to stabilize it, for that would be impossible—but in order to imagine routes within it that would make for a less tumultuous crossing of the sea the world has become.If we do not want to make the mistake of applying old remedies to new illnesses, or to wander ¡n vain in our own smug conceptuality (which has become nothing but ineffectual jargon), we must remember that we scholars need to apply a mix of good sense, humility and theoretical radicalism.This will give us a renewed capacity for observation and analysis, Political philosophy should not institute itself primarily as a public elaboration of criteria of judgment, or as the rational production of a set of guiding values to be put into practice; it should not seek to be a discourse internalto the City. Before it takes on these tasks, it must first begin the radical deconstruction of its own concepts; it must clear the rubble of the Modern off the ground—for today, that rubble hinders more than it helps.

#### ---The Indian caste system proves capitalism isn’t the root of all exploitation --- This is a 100% takeout since their totalizing claim that all history is organized by class means all we need is one example to disprove it.

Steele 1992

David Ramsay, author and Editorial Director of Open Court Publishing Company - *From Marx to Mises: Post-Capitalist Society and the Challenge of Economic Calculation* pg. 361-362

To contradict historical materialism, it's only necessary to claim that the relations changed once for some reason other than the development of the forces, or that the superstructure changed once for some reason other than the adjustment of the relations to the forces. To pick an example at random, one scholar of the origin of states, summarizing what is known about this momentous class of historical events, states that the formation of states had many repercussions for technology and the economy, but was not itself a response to technological improvement (R. Cohen 1978). The question for historical materialism is not whether Ronald Cohen is wrong about this, but why we should suppose, before we look at the evidence, that he must be wrong. Why couldn 't spontaneous political processes—inter-group dynamics of disputes and war—give rise to a state, which then acts directly on both the forces and the relations, not to mention the superstructure? Why cudgel history to make it fit one pattern on all occasions, when no good reason has been given for the exclusion of alternative patterns? The Indian caste system has survived for thousands of years, and has had enormous repercussions for every aspect of Indian life. It seems to have arisen because conquerors wanted to maintain racial distinctness from their subjects. No one can seriously claim that caste has arisen because of the forces or the relations of production. Numerous societies have had very similar technologies and property systems without a caste system. It appears that historical materialists have only one recourse, faced with examples like this: they must accept that the superstructure and the forms of consciousness corresponding to it are only a part, and may be only a small part, of any given culture. Historical materialism then ceases to be a master theory explaining the broad course of historical development, and becomes a more limited set of claims about the relations between forces and relations of production.

# FW

### 2AC Overall Interp of Debate

#### Before we answer what debate should be like, we must ask what debate IS – debaters are obsessed with finding monolithic interpretations of debate instead of ever leaving it open for possibility – framework assumes we’ve broken a cardinal rule, but the best part of debate is there are no written rules – instead we have norms that should be up for contestation – the activity means something different to every participant and audience member – that’s Cohen – framework attempts to impose order on an inherently chaotic system, causing rhetorical warfare, foreclosing evolutionary potential – that’s Lakoff – their interpretation functions as the worst form of conservativism.

#### ---Framework imposed rules stifles creative evolution and leads to the downfall of debate.

#### Johnston 2000

Ian, retired instructor at Vancouver island university, “there’s nothing Nietzsche couldn’t teach ya about the raising of the wrist” <http://records.viu.ca/~johnstoi/introser/nietzs.htm>

For Nietzsche Europe is in crisis. It has a growing power to make life comfortable and an enormous energy. But people seem to want to channel that energy into arguing about what amounts to competing fictions and to force everyone to adhere to a particular fiction. Why is this insight so worrying? Well, one point is that dogmatists get aggressive. Soccer players and rugby players who forget what Nietzsche is pointing out can start killing each other over questions which admit of no answer, namely, questions about which group has the true game, which group has privileged access to the truth. Nietzsche senses that dogmatism is going to lead to warfare, and he predicts that the twentieth century will see an unparalleled extension of warfare in the name of competing dogmatic truths. Part of his project is to wake up the people who are intelligent enough to respond to what he's talking about so that they can recognize the stupidity of killing each other for an illusion which they mistake for some "truth." In addition to that, Nietzsche, like Mill (although in a very different manner), is serious concerned about the possibilities for human excellence in a culture where the herd mentality is taking over, where Europe is developing into competing herds--a situation which is either sweeping up the best and the brightest or is stifling them entirely. Nietzsche, like Mill and the ancient pre-Socratic Greeks to whom he constantly refers, is an elitist. He wants the potential for individual human excellence to be liberated from the harnesses of conformity and group competition and conventional morality. Otherwise, human beings are going to become destructive, lazy, conforming herd animals, using technology to divert them from the greatest joys in life, which come only from individual striving and creativity, activities which require one to release one's instincts without keeping them eternally subjugated to an overpowering historical consciousness or a conventional morality of good and evil. What makes this particularly a problem for Nietzsche is that he sees that a certain form of game is gaining popularity: democratic volleyball. In this game, the rule book insists that all players be treated equally, that there be no natural authority given to the best players or to those who best understand the nature of quality play. Hence the mass of inferior players is taking over, the quality of the play is deteriorating, and there are fewer and fewer good volleyball players. This process is being encouraged both by the traditional ethic of "help your neighbour" (now often in a socialist uniform) and (as mentioned above) by modern science).  As the mass of more numerous inferior players takes over the sport, the mindless violence of their desires to attack other players and take over their games increases, as does their hostility to those who are uniquely excellent (who may well need a mask to prevent themselves being recognized).

### 2AC Resolved

#### Resolved means to analyze and break up.

Merriam/Webster Dictionary, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/resolve>

transitive verb 1 obsolete : [dissolve](http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/dissolve), [melt](http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/melt) 2 a : break up, [separate](http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/separate) <the prism resolved the light into a play of color>; also : to change by disintegration b : to reduce by analysis <resolve the problem into [simple](http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/resolve) elements> c : to distinguish between or make independently visible adjacent parts of d : to separate (a racemic compound or mixture) into the two components 3 : to cause [resolution](http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/resolution) of (a pathological state) 4 a : to deal with successfully : clear up <resolve doubts> <resolve a dispute> b : to find an answer to c : to make clear or understandable d : to find a mathematical solution of e : to split up (as a vector) into two or more components especially in assigned directions 5 : to reach a firm decision about <resolve to get more sleep> <resolve disputed points in a text> 6 a : to declare or decide by a formal resolution and vote b : to change by resolution or formal vote <the [house](http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/resolve) resolved itself into a committee> 7 : to make (as voice parts) progress from dissonance to consonance 8 : to work out the resolution of (as a play) intransitive verb 1: to become separated into component parts; also : to become reduced by dissolving or analysis 2: to form a resolution : [determine](http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/determine) 3: consult, [deliberate](http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/deliberate) 4: to progress from dissonance to consonance

### 2AC Colon :

#### The context of the resolution is determined before the colon.

Peck 96 (U of Ottawa; <http://www.uottawa.ca/academic/arts/writcent/hypergrammar/colon.html>)

The colon focuses the reader’s attention on what to follow, and as a result, you should use it to introduce an idea that somehow completes the introductory idea.

### 2AC Should

Should indicates criticism.

Oxford, ‘5 [Aug 16, 2005; http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/should?]

Definition of should in English

should

Pronunciation: /ʃʊd/

verb (3rd sing. should)

1 used to indicate obligation, duty, or correctness, typically when criticizing someone’s actions:

he should have been careful

I think we should trust our people more

you shouldn’t have gone

* indicating a desirable or expected state:

by now pupils should be able to read with a large degree of independence

* used to give or ask advice or suggestions:

you should go back to bed

what should I wear?

* (I should) used to give advice:

I should hold out if I were you

### 2AC Statute

#### A statute is a rule decided for the government

Collins English Dictionary – Complete and Unabridged © HarperCollins Publishers 1991, 1994, 1998, 2000, 2003

statute [ˈstætjuːt]

n

2. (Law) a permanent rule made by a body or institution for the government of its internal affairs

### ---AT Role Playing

#### Role playing leads to political monologue – supports oppressive structures and eliminates agency to question power.

Smith, ‘97 (Steve, University of Wales, Professor and Pro-Vice Chancellor of the University, University of Wales, Aberystwyth “Power and Truth, A Reply to William Wallace,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Oct., 1997), p. 513, NAP)

Those academics who do get involved in talking truth to power must accept that in so doing they must adopt the agenda of those to whom they are talking. They will be involved in problem-solving, and thereby must accept the 'givens' of the policy debate. Policy-makers see certain things as givens; therefore if you write about them in order to influence the policy debate, you tend to have to write as if they are given as well. For academics such 'givens' are rarely seen as such. This has extremely important political and intellectual consequences since it questions the very notion of talking 'truth' to power. It is more a case of accepting the policy agenda of those to whom one is talking and then giving them a series of alternative ways of proceeding. I see no connection between this and speaking 'truth to power'. I can also admit the tendency to make what one says acceptable to those 'listening', so as to ensure that one is indeed 'listened to'. But more importantly, why should academics take the policy agenda of governments as the starting point? Why do we privilege that starting point rather than the needs and wants of the have-nots in our society or in the global political system? Indeed, maybe speaking 'truth to power' is itself a very political act, albeit in the name of academic neutrality, an act that supports the existing division of resources in the world. This situation is made all the worse once the possibility arises of getting funding from policy-making bodies, however much the individual academic wants to maintain the independence of his or her research. In my view, academics need a critical distance from which to look at the activities of governments. Perhaps the greatest form of isolation and self-righteousness is to accept the policy-makers' view of the world as the starting point, so that the academic sees the world as the policy-maker sees it. Where would questions of gender, famine, and racism fit into that world-view? Yet aren't these every bit as 'political' and 'international' as the traditional agenda? This seems to me to take us very far indeed from the idea of 'speaking truth to power'; the danger must be of telling the powerful what they want to hear and of working within their world-view. Of course, academics spend much time trying to avoid these dangers, and Wallace himself cannot be accused of simply adopting the agenda of the powerful, but surely he would admit that these dangers are profound and very difficult to avoid, especially if one wants to have influence and prestige within the policy-making community. My objection is really to those who pretend that any of this has anything to do with truth and academic objectivity.

### ---2AC T Version - Herod

**War policies are not accidents – they are deliberate attempts to expand the state dominance – the government doesn’t care what we think it “should” do – reformist focus prevents true change.**

Herod, ‘1 (James, “A Stake, Not a Mistake: On Not Seeing the Enemy,” October. <http://www.jamesherod.info/index.php?sec=paper&id=9>)

I spent several years in the early sixties studying Underdevelopment. It was frustrating, in that none of the theories I examined really seemed to explain the phenomenon. That is, the Theories of Development that were prevalent then (only in mainstream discourse, I later learned) didn't really answer the question: Why are some countries poor? I would look at US Aid programs, only to conclude that they didn't work, that they didn't help countries develop, and often got in the way. My response at that time was to argue, and to try to call to the attention of US Aid administrators, that the programs weren't working, and were not achieving the results they were supposed to. The programs were not facilitating development and economic growth in the countries they were supposed to be benefiting. Fortunately for me, with the explosion and re-emergence of radical consciousness in late sixties, I was able to overcome this naiveté. Unfortunately though, for much of the American Left (especially for its so-called progressive wing), this naiveté, this bad habit of not seeing the enemy, this tendency to think that the US government's policies and actions are just mistakes, this seemingly ineradicable belief that the US government means well, is the most common outlook. It was certainly the majoritarian belief among those who opposed the Vietnam War. I helped write a broad sheet once, which we distributed at a big anti-war demonstration in Washington DC in November 1969, and which was titled "Vietnam is a Stake not a Mistake". In this document we spelled out the imperial reasons which explained why the government was waging war, quite deliberately and rationally, against Vietnam. In subsequent decades there has been no end to the commentators who take the 'this is a mistake' line. Throughout the low intensity (i.e., terrorist) wars against Nicaragua and El Salvadorin the 1980s we heard this complaint again and again. It is currently seen in the constant stream of commentaries onthe US assault on Colombia. It has been heard repeatedly during the past two years in the demonstrations against the World Bank and theWorldTrade Organization. Protesters complain that the WTO's policies of structural adjustment are having the opposite effect of what they're suppose to. That is, they are hindering, not facilitating, development, and causing poverty, not alleviating it.¶ Two years ago, in 1999,throughout the 78 day bombing attack on Yugoslavia, much of the outpouring of progressive commentary on the event (that which didn't actually endorse the bombing that is) argued that "this is a mistake".[1] My favorite quote from that episode, was from Robert Hayden, Director of the Center for Russian and East European Studies at the University of Pittsburgh, being interviewed by Amy Goodman on Democracy Now, April 19, 1999. He said: "But we have the Clinton administration that developed a diplomacy that seems to have been intended to have produced this war, and now the Clinton administration's actions seem determined to produce a wider war." Amy Goodman: "Why would the Clinton Administration want to produce a war?" Hayden: "Boy, you know what? You've got me there. And as I say, you have to go back to the simple principles of incompetence. Never assume competence on the part of these guys." This was surely the bottom of the pit for the 'this is a mistake' crowd. I could cite quotes like this by the dozen, but instead let me turn to our current "war".¶ So what has been the response of the 'progressive community' to the bombing of Afghanistan? As usual, they just don't get it. They just can't seem to grasp the simple fact that the government does this stuff on purpose. Endlessly, progressives talk as if the government is just making a mistake, does not see the real consequences of its actions, or is acting irrationally, and they hope to correct the government's course by pointing out the errors of its ways. Progressives assume that their goals -- peace, justice, well-being -- are also the government's goals. So when they look at what the government is doing, they get alarmed and puzzled, because it is obvious that the government's actions are not achieving these goals. So they cry out: "Hey, this policy doesn't lead to peace!" or "Hey, this policy doesn't achieve justice (or democracy, or development)!" By pointing this out, they hope to educate the government, to help it to see its mistakes, to convince it that its policies are not having the desired results.[2]¶ How can they not see that the US government acts deliberately, and that it knows what it is doing? How can they not see that the government's goals are not peace and justice, but empire and profit. It wants these wars, this repression. These policies are not mistakes; they are not irrational; they are not based on a failure of moral insight (sincemorality is not even a factor in their considerations); they are not aberrations; they are not based on a failure to analyze the situation correctly; they are not based on ignorance. This repression, these bombings, wars, massacres, assassinations, and covert actions are the coldly calculated, rational, consistent, intelligent, and informed actions of a ruling class determined at all costs to keep its power and wealth and preserve its way of life (capitalism). It has demonstrated great historical presence, persistence, and continuity in pursuing this objective. This ruling class knows that it is committing atrocities, knows that it is destroying democracy, hope, welfare, peace, and justice, knows that it is murdering, massacring, slaughtering, poisoning, torturing, lying, stealing, and it doesn't care. Yet most progressives seem to believe that if only they point out often enough and loud enough that the ruling class is murdering people, that it will wake up, take notice, apologize, and stop doing it.¶ Here is a typical expression of this naiveté (written by an author, Brian Willson, who was in the process of introducing a list of US interventions abroad!):¶ "Many of us are continually disturbed and grief stricken because it seems that our U.S. government does not yet understand: (a) the historical social, cultural, and economic issues that underlay most of the political and ecological problems of the world; (b) the need to comply with, as legally agreed to, rather than continually defy, international law and international institutions established for addressing conflict; and (c) that military solutions, including production, sale, and use of the latest in technological weapons, are simply ill-equipped and wrong-headed for solving fundamental social and economic problems." [3]¶ He is wrong on all three counts. (a)The US government has an intimate, detailed knowledge of the social, cultural, and economic characteristics of every country it intervenes in. It is especially familiar with the ethnic, linguistic, political, and religious divisions within the country. It is not interested in how these issues "underlay most of the political and ecological problems of the world", since it is not interested in those problems, certainly not in solving them, since it is the main creator of those problems. Rather, it uses its expert knowledge to manipulate events within the country in order to advance its own goals, profit and empire. (b) The US government understands perfectly that it expressly needs not to comply with international law in order to maintain its ability to act unilaterally, unfettered by any constraints, to advance its imperial aims. The claim that the US defies international law because of a misunderstanding is absurd. (c) Who says that the US government is trying to solve "fundamental social and economic problems"? These are not its aims at all. The objectives that it does pursue, consciously and relentlessly, namely profit and empire, are in fact the causes of these very "social and economic problems".Furthermore, for its true aims, military solutions, far from being "ill-equipped and wrong-headed", work exceptionally well. Military might sustains the empire. Arming every little client regime of the international ruling class with 'the latest in technological weapons" is necessary, and quite effective, in maintaining the repressive apparatus needed to defend empire, in addition to raking in lots of profit for the arms manufacturers. But evidently Mr. Willson "does not yet understand" any of these things.¶ Let's take another example. Russell Mokhiber and Robert Weissman, otherwise very sensible writers, complain that "bombing a desperately poor country under the yoke of a repressive regime is a wrongheaded response [to the "unspeakable acts of violence" committed on Sept. 11]. "The U.S. bombing of Afghanistan should cease immediately," they say. They discuss three reasons: "1. The policy of bombing increases the risk of further terrorism against the United States. 2. The bombing is intensifying a humanitarian nightmare in Afghanistan. 3. There are better ways to seek justice." All three statements are true of course, but irrelevant, because seeking justice, avoiding humanitarian nightmares, and reducing the risk of terrorism do not enter into the calculations of US policy makers. Quite the contrary, US policy makers create injustice, humanitarian nightmares, and terrorism, throughout the world, in pursuit of the imperial objective of making profit, and this has been thoroughly documented in thousands of scholarly studies. So for Mokhiber and Weissman to talk in this way, and phrase the problem in this way, exposes their failure to really comprehend the enemy we face, which in turn prevents them from finding [sic] effective strategies to defeat that enemy, like so many other opponents of the "war". Hence all the moralizing, the bulk of which is definitely directed at the rulers, not at the ruled. That is, it is not an attempt to win over the ruled, but an attempt to win over the rulers.[4]¶ It's what I call the "we should" crowd -- all those people who hope to have a voice in the formation of policy, people whose stances are basically that of consultants to the ruling class. "We" should do this, "we" shouldn't do that, as if they had anything at all to say about what our rulers do. This is the normal stance among the bootlicking intelligentsia of course. But what is it doing among progressives and radicals? Even if their stance is seen to be not exactly that of consultants, but that of citizens making demands upon their government, what makes them think that the government ever care [sic] ? I think this attitude --the "we should" attitude -- is rooted in part at least in the fact that most progressives still believe in nations and governments. They believe that this is "our" country, and that this is "our" government, or at least should be. So Kevin Danaher says that "we should get control of the government." They identify themselves as Americans, or Germans, or Mexicans, or Swedes. So they are constantly advising and making demands that 'their' government should do this and that. If they would reject nationalism altogether, and states and governments, they could begin to see another way.¶ A variation of the 'this is a mistake' theme has appeared in commentaries on the present "war", on Afghanistan. Progressives argue that the US is "falling into a trap". They argue that Osama bin Laden had hoped to provoke the US into doing just what it is doing, attacking Afghanistan. In their view, the US government is being stupid, acting ignorantly [sic], responding irrationally, and showing incompetence. That is, it is "making a mistake".It never seems to occur to these analysts that the government may actually be awake, even alert, or that it jumped at the opportunity offered it by the attacks of September Eleven to do what it had wanted to do anyway -- seize Afghanistan, build a big new base in Uzbekistan, declare unending war on the enemies of Empire everywhere, and initiate draconian repression against internal dissent in order to achieve "domestic tranquility".

# 1AR

Embrace instability of argumentation – a turn to openness is the most meaningful decision – star this card.

Corder, ‘85 [Jim W. Corder is Professor of English at Texas Christian University. In 1975 he received the NCTE's Braddock Prize. He has published articles on rhetoric in various journals and has written several textbooks on writing.; “Argument as Emergence, Rhetoric as Love”; Rhetoric Review, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Sep., 1985); Taylor & Francis]

d. We arguers can learn the lessons that rhetoric itself wants to teach us. By its nature, invention asks us to open ourselves to the richness of creation, to plumb its depths, search its expanses, and track its chronologies. But the moment we speak (or write), we are no longer open; we have chosen, whether deliberately or not, and so have closed ourselves off from some possibilities. Invention wants openness; structure and style demand closure. We are asked to be perpetually open and always closing. If we stay open, we cannot speak or act; if we are [sic] closed, we have succumbed to dogma and rigidity. Each utterance may deplete the inventive possibilities if a speaker falls into arro- gance, ignorance, or dogma. But each utterance, if the speaker having spoken opens again, may also nurture and replenish the speaker's inventive world and enable him or her to reach out around the other. Beyond any speaker's bound inventive world lies another: there lie the riches of creation, the great, un- bounded possible universe of invention. All time is there, past, present, and future. The natural and the supernatural are there. All creation is there, ground and source for invention. The knowledge we have is formed out of the plenti- tude of creation, which is all before us, but must be sought again and again through the cycling process of rhetoric, closing to speak, opening again to invent again. In an unlimited universe of meaning, we can never foreclose on interpretation and argument. Invention is a name for a great miracle-the attempt to unbind time, to loosen the capacities of time and space into our speaking. This copiousness is eternally there, a plentitude for all. Piaget remarked that the more an infant senses [sic], the more he or she wants to sense the world [sic]. Just this is what the cycling of rhetoric offers us: opening to invention, closing to speak, opening again to a richer invention. Utterances may thus be elevated, may grow to hold both arguer and other.

#### Demands for fairness celebrate institutionalized inequality.

Fish, ’93 (Stanley Fish, writer for the Atlantic professor of humanities and law at Florida International University, in Miami, and dean emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences at the University of Illinois at Chicago. He has also taught at the University of California at Berkeley, Johns Hopkins and Duke University. He is the author of 11 books, most recently “Save the World On Your Own Time,” on higher education. “The Fugitive in Flight,” a study of the 1960s TV drama, will be published in 2010., The Atlantic, Reverse Racism, or How the Pot Got to Call the Kettle Black, <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1993/11/reverse-racism-or-how-the-pot-got-to-call-the-kettle-black/4638/?single_page=true>)

The same insincerity and hollowness of promise infect another formula that is popular with the anti-affirmative-action crowd: the formula of the level playing field. Here the argument usually takes the form of saying "It is undemocratic to give one class of citizens advantages at the expense of other citizens; the truly democratic way is to have a level playing field to which everyone has access and where everyone has a fair and equal chance to succeed on the basis of his or her merit." Fine words--but they conceal the facts of the situation as it has been given to us by history: the playing field is already tilted in favor of those by whom and for whom it was constructed in the first place. If mastery of the requirements for entry depends upon immersion in the cultural experiences of the mainstream majority, if the skills that make for success are nurtured by institutions and cultural practices from which the disadvantaged minority has been systematically excluded, if the language and ways of comporting oneself that identify a player as "one of us" are alien to the lives minorities are forced to live, then words like "fair" and "equal" are cruel jokes, for what they promote and celebrate is an institutionalized unfairness and a perpetuated inequality. The playing field is already tilted, and the resistance to altering it by the mechanisms of affirmative action is in fact a determination to make sure that the present imbalances persist as long as possible.